Monk v VI Water & Power Auth by unknown
1995 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-20-1995 
Monk v VI Water & Power Auth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 
Recommended Citation 
"Monk v VI Water & Power Auth" (1995). 1995 Decisions. 106. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/106 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1995 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 94-7372 
 ___________ 
 
 
 TED MARK MONK, 
        Appellant   
 
 v. 
 
 VIRGIN ISLANDS WATER & POWER AUTHORITY; 
 QUALITY ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 
 
 
 _______________________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
 Division of St. Croix 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 91-cv-00077) 
 ___________________ 
 
 
 Argued December 5, 1994 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, Chief Judge, 
 SCIRICA and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed April 20, 1995) 
 
 
     THOMAS ALKON, ESQUIRE (Argued) 
     Alkon, Rhea & Hart 
     2115 Queen Street, Suite 101 
     Christiansted, St. Croix 
     U.S. Virgin Islands 00820 
 
       Attorney for Appellant 
 
 
     RHYS S. HODGE, ESQUIRE 
     Law Offices of Rhys S. Hodge 
     19 Norre Gade 
     P.O. Box 6520 
     Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas 
     U.S. Virgin Islands 00804 
 
  
       Attorney for Appellee, 
       Virgin Islands Water 
         & Power Authority 
  
     R. ERIC MOORE, ESQUIRE (Argued) 
     Law Office of R. Eric Moore 
     Downtown Station 
     P.O. Box 3086 
     Christiansted, St. Croix 
     U.S. Virgin Islands 00822 
 
     Attorney for Appellee, 
     Quality Electric Supply Company 
 
 __________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this appeal, we are required to interpret and apply 
various sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to a 
lawsuit arising from a tragic construction accident in the Virgin 
Islands.  The primary issue is the viability of Restatement 
section 343A, involving the doctrine of assumption of risk, in 
light of the Virgin Islands' adoption of a comparative negligence 
statute.  We also consider whether employers may be liable for 
injuries to their independent contractors' employees under 
Restatement section 413 and similar provisions.  The district 
court granted summary judgment to the defendant landowner, 
holding that the Restatement provisions shielded it from tort 
claims by a worker injured on the property.  We will affirm. 
 I. 
 In June 1990, a fire destroyed a building on St. Croix 
owned by Quality Electric Supply Company.  The following month 
Quality Electric contracted with Benak Construction Company to 
demolish the remains of the original structure and to construct a 
  
new building.  Ted Monk, Sr., a partner in Benak and head of the 
project, named his son, Ted Monk, Jr. ("Monk"), as foreman of the 
site. 
 At the time of construction, the Virgin Islands Water & 
Power Authority ("WAPA") maintained 7,200-volt power lines 
several feet above part of the proposed building.  The power 
lines were clearly visible, and there is no dispute that everyone 
involved with the project knew about the lines and that any 
contact with them would be dangerous.1  On November 8, 1990, a 
crane was being used to lift steel joists that would connect the 
columns of the building frame.  The first joist was installed 
with the use of a "tag line," a rope attached to the beam to 
prevent it from swinging.  Monk decided not to use a tag line to 
install the next joist, however, because he thought he could 
better control the joist from swinging by holding it directly 
with his hands.  At this point, Monk, Sr., yelled for his son to 
use a tag line.  As Monk prepared to do so, the steel joist 
touched an overhead power line, sending an electrical current 
through his body.  He suffered severe burns that resulted in the 
amputation of both his legs and his left arm.  
                     
1
.  As the district court noted, the Benak supervisor at the 
site, Paul Christoff, testified in his deposition that "everyone 
present at the work site knew that the lines were energized.  In 
fact, Christoff heard Monk, Sr., specifically tell his son, the 
plaintiff, to be careful of the lines because they were 'hot.'"  
See Monk v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., No. 91-0077, slip 
op. at 3 n.2 (D.V.I. Jan. 24, 1994).  For direct evidence of the 
plaintiff's knowledge of the power lines and their danger, see 
infra part II.C.   
  
 Monk then filed this suit for personal injuries against 
Quality Electric and WAPA.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Quality Electric, but denied summary 
judgment to WAPA.  Monk v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 
No. 91-0077 (D.V.I. Jan. 24, 1994).  Monk settled with WAPA, but 
appealed the district court's judgment as to Quality Electric. 
 The district court had jurisdiction of the case 
pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1612 (1988).  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), and our review of a grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993).  Summary judgment 
is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 II. 
 In the Virgin Islands, the various Restatements of law 
provide the rules of decision in the absence of local laws to the 
contrary.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 4 (1967);2 Williams v. Martin 
Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030, 1033 (3d Cir. 1987).  We 
are called upon here to determine whether section 343A of the 
                     
2
.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 4 (1967) provides: 
 
  The rules of the common law, as 
expressed in the restatements of the law 
approved by the American Law Institute, and 
to the extent not so expressed, as generally 
understood and applied in the United States, 
shall be the rules of decision in the courts 
of the Virgin Islands in cases to which they 
apply, in the absence of local laws to the 
contrary. 
  
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) survives enactment of the 
Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute. 
 A. 
 At common law, a plaintiff's contributory negligence 
barred any subsequent recovery for damages, even if the plaintiff 
was only slightly at fault.  W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 65, 67, at 451-52, 468-69 (5th ed. 
1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 467.  Similarly, the 
common law doctrine of assumption of risk prevented recovery when 
a plaintiff was deemed to have assumed the risk of a known 
danger.  Keeton et al., supra, § 68, at 495-96; Restatement § 
496A. 
 While these rules were still in force throughout most 
of the United States, the American Law Institute incorporated 
section 343A on "Known or Obvious Dangers" into the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.  Section 343A provides in relevant part: 
 A possessor of land is not liable to his 
invitees3 for physical harm caused to them by 
any activity or condition on the land whose 
danger is known or obvious to them, unless 
the possessor should anticipate the harm 
despite such knowledge or obviousness. 
                     
3
.  The Restatement definition of "invitee" includes a "business 
visitor," which is defined as "a person who is invited to enter 
or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected 
with business dealings with the possessor of the land."  
Restatement § 332.  There is no dispute that Monk is an 
"invitee," within the meaning of the Restatement. 
  
(footnote added).  Section 343A's focus on dangers "known or 
obvious" to invitees, along with pertinent commentary,4 indicated 
it was intended as a variation on the doctrine of assumption of 
risk.  See, e.g., Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 395-96 (Del. 
1992) (noting section "343A's apparent espousal of assumption of 
risk as a bar to recovery"). 
 Soon after adoption of the Second Restatement in 1965, 
however, the principle of apportioning damages between negligent 
plaintiffs and defendants under a comparative fault system began 
"veritably sweeping the land."  Keeton et al., supra, § 67, at 
479.  "Although by the mid-1960s only seven states had replaced 
contributory negligence with comparative fault, several states 
switched over in 1969, and the 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a 
surge of legislative and judicial action accomplishing the 
                     
4
.  For example, comment e to section 343A provides: 
 
  In the ordinary case, an invitee who 
enters land is entitled to nothing more than 
knowledge of the conditions and dangers he 
will encounter if he comes.  If he knows the 
actual conditions, and the activities carried 
on, and the dangers involved in either, he is 
free to make an intelligent choice as to 
whether the advantage to be gained is 
sufficient to justify him in incurring the 
risk by entering or remaining on the land.  
The possessor of the land may reasonably 
assume that he will protect himself by the 
exercise of ordinary care, or that he will 
voluntarily assume the risk of harm if he 
does not succeed in doing so.  Reasonable 
care on the part of the possessor therefore 
does not ordinarily require precautions, or 
even warning, against dangers which are known 
to the visitor, or so obvious to him that he 
may be expected to discover them. 
  
switch."  Id. at 471 (footnotes omitted).  All but four states 
now have adopted the doctrine.5   
 The movement toward comparative negligence, however, 
raised questions concerning the continued viability of the 
assumption of risk defense,6 which often resembled contributory 
negligence.7  See, e.g., id. § 68, at 495 ("The rise of 
                     
5
.  Those four states are Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and 
Virginia.  See Jean W. Sexton, Recent Decision, Tort Law -- 
Assumption of Risk and Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence 
Statute: Howell v. Clyde, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 903, 903 & n.2 (1994); 
see also Williams v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 
1333 (Ala. 1993); Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 456 
A.2d 894, 905 (Md. 1983); Campbell v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 
619 A.2d 213, 219 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 627 A.2d 
538 (Md. 1993); Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (N.C. 1968); 
Bowden v. Bell, 446 S.E.2d 816, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); 
Litchford v. Hancock, 352 S.E.2d 335, 337 (Va. 1987). 
6
.  Our discussion involves only the implied form of assumption 
of risk, not a defense based on an express contract.  Defenses 
based on express assumption of risk remain valid in virtually all 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68, at 496 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes 
omitted) ("[A]bsent policy reasons for prohibiting contractual 
disclaimers of this type in certain contexts, an express 
assumption of risk by the plaintiff should continue to serve as a 
total bar in comparative negligence cases."); 1 J.D. Lee & Barry 
A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law § 9.07, at 250 (1988) ("In 
jurisdictions which have adopted comparative fault statutes, it 
has generally been held that the defense of express assumption of 
risk survives the enactment of such statutes."); 3 Stuart M. 
Speiser et al., The American Law of Torts § 13:39, at 808 (1986) 
("Express assumption of risk, as distinguished from implied 
assumption of risk, has retained its viability as an absolute 
defense despite the advent of comparative negligence.  This 
proposition is supported by cases from numerous jurisdictions.").  
7
.  For a discussion of the different forms of assumption of 
risk, see infra part II.B; cf. Restatement § 496A cmt. c; Keeton, 
supra, § 68, at 480-81 & 481 n.10.  For purposes of this case, we 
adhere to the distinctions noted in Keegan v. Anchor Inns, Inc., 
606 F.2d 35, 39-41 (3d Cir. 1979).  As we explained in Keegan, 
"Assumption of risk in its secondary sense is ordinarily 
synonymous with contributory negligence and involves a failure to 
  
comparative negligence has forced the courts and commentators to 
consider afresh the proper role for the assumption of risk 
defense.").  Some jurisdictions that abolished contributory 
negligence also eliminated assumption of risk by statute.8  Other 
states left the issue for their courts to decide, which resulted 
in a range of decisions across the spectrum.9  Most courts 
rejected the defense,10 others continued it, and some supported 
certain forms of it but rejected others.11 
(..continued) 
exercise reasonable care for one's own safety. . . . Assumption 
of risk in its primary and strict sense involves voluntary 
exposure to an obvious or known danger which negates liability."  
Id. at 39 n.5 (citations omitted).  
8
.  "[S]everal comparative negligence statutes by their terms 
abolish assumption of risk, in addition to contributory 
negligence, as defenses that will bar liability altogether."  
Keeton et al., supra, § 68, at 495-96 (citing several cases and 
statutes); see also Speiser et al., supra, § 13:33, at 787 
("There are a number of jurisdictions in which implied assumption 
of risk was abolished by statute.").  
9
.  Keeton et al., supra, § 68, at 496 ("Most of the statutes, 
however, are silent on assumption of risk, and so the matter has 
been thrown over to the courts."); Speiser et al., supra, § 
13:33, at 787 ("[I]n most jurisdictions, the statute by which 
comparative negligence was enacted did not expressly deal with 
assumption of risk, leaving it to the courts to deal with the 
viability of the doctrine . . . .").  
10
.  See, e.g., Lee & Lindahl, supra, § 9.05, at 246 ("[M]ost 
states have allowed the entire concept [of assumption of risk] to 
be subsumed within comparative negligence by either abrogating it 
or providing for its merger with comparative fault principles."); 
Speiser et al., supra, § 13:33, at 787 ("[T]here are a number of 
jurisdictions, decidedly representing a minority, in which 
assumption of risk was retained as a separate defense under the 
comparative negligence system."). 
11
.  For a state-by-state analysis of the viability of assumption 
of risk after adoption of comparative negligence, see Speiser et 
al., supra, §§ 13:33-:39, at 784-809; see also Keeton et al., 
  
 Depending upon their position on the viability of 
assumption of risk, courts also decided whether to continue using 
section 343A of the Restatement.  As with assumption of risk 
generally, some courts opted to continue using section 343A,12 
others decided against it, and still others decided the 
applicability of section 343A depended on the type of assumption 
of risk involved.13   
 B. 
 In 1973, the Virgin Islands abolished the common law 
rule that a plaintiff's contributory negligence barred any 
recovery.  In its place, it adopted a comparative negligence 
statute that apportioned fault between the plaintiff and 
defendant.  See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 1451 (Supp. 1993);14 
(..continued) 
supra, § 68, at 495-498; Lee & Lindahl, supra, § 9.05, at 245-
247.  
12
.  See, e.g., Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 124-25 (Pa. 
1983). 
13
.  See, e.g., Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 398 (Del. 
1992) (rejecting use of section 343A when the alleged assumption 
of risk was secondary type, but noting that it "might well" apply 
when assumption of risk was primary type).  For a summary of 
judicial opinion regarding the applicability of section 343A in 
comparative negligence jurisdictions, see id. at 395-98. 
14
.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 1451(a) (Supp. 1993) provides in 
relevant part: 
 
  In any action based upon negligence to 
recover for injury to person or property, the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff 
shall not bar a recovery, but the damages 
shall be diminished by the trier of fact in 
proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the plaintiff.  The burden of 
proving contributory negligence shall be on 
the defendant.  If such claimant is found by 
  
Keegan v. Anchor Inns, Inc., 606 F.2d 35, 37-38 (3d Cir. 1979).  
Monk contends this statute implicitly abolished assumption of 
risk as a defense, thereby contradicting Restatement section 343A 
and nullifying its viability. 
 In Keegan, id. at 37-41, we examined the Virgin Islands 
comparative negligence statute and its effect on the doctrine of 
assumption of risk.  We held the statute abrogated one type of 
the assumption of risk defense, but left the other form intact: 
 Assumption of risk is not necessarily 
grounded on the concept of fault.  Sometimes 
the defense has been invoked when the 
plaintiff's conduct could be characterized as 
negligent; sometimes it has been invoked in 
its "strict" or "primary" sense when the 
conduct amounted to consent.  In those cases 
where the plaintiff's conduct amounts to 
negligence, that fact should be accorded 
weight only within the comparative scheme of 
the statute.  In such a case assumption of 
risk is not available as a bar to recovery. . 
. .  It follows that when conduct amounts to 
a voluntary waiver or consent the absolute 
bar to recovery should remain. 
(..continued) 
the trier of fact to be more at fault than 
the defendant, or, in the case of multiple 
defendants, more at fault than the combined 
fault of the defendants, the claimant may not 
recover. 
  
Id. at 40.  We employed this distinction between the two types of 
assumption of risk in Smollett v. Skayting Development Corp., 793 
F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1986).  In Smollett, a woman injured while ice 
skating sued the operator of the rink, complaining that the lack 
of guardrails and the carpeted floor surrounding the ice caused 
her injuries.  The jury found for the plaintiff, and the district 
court denied the defendant's motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.  On appeal, we reversed and directed 
the district court to enter judgment for the defendant, holding 
that the evidence showed the plaintiff "fully understood the risk 
of harm to herself and voluntarily chose to enter the area of 
risk.  She, therefore, implicitly assumed the risk of injury."  
Id. at 548 (citation omitted).  In so ruling, we reiterated the 
comparative negligence statute's effect on assumption of risk: 
 Assumption of risk is still available as a 
complete defense to a negligence claim but it 
has been limited by enactment of the 
comparative negligence statute.  Assumption 
of risk, to the extent it incorporates the 
concept of fault on the part of the actor 
and, therefore, overlaps with contributory 
negligence, is no longer available as a 
defense.  However, assumption of risk can 
still be applied to "non-negligent conduct 
which constitutes waiver or consent" but 
which involved no negligence.  In such cases 
the absolute bar to recovery remains. 
Id. (quoting Keegan, 606 F.2d at 41 n.8).  Therefore, the 
"primary" form of assumption of risk remains a viable defense in 
the Virgin Islands.15  Because Restatement section 343A requires 
                     
15
.  We disagree with Monk's assertion that the judicial 
rejection of sections 343 and 343A under federal admiralty law 
controls this case.  It is true that we have held those 
  
a plaintiff's implicit acquiescence to "known or obvious 
dangers," the essence of the primary form of assumption of risk, 
this Restatement provision also remains valid under Virgin 
Islands law. 
 We recognize our holding on assumption of risk may not 
represent the view of a majority of jurisdictions.16  But many of 
(..continued) 
Restatement sections inapplicable to actions arising under the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
905(b).  See Davis v. Portline Transportes Maritime 
Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 542 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that 
"[s]ome portions of the Restatement's approach, however, clearly 
do not fit within the paradigm the Act constructs" and citing 
section 343A as an example); Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 
596 F.2d 541, 551 n.21 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Sections 343 and 343A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts . . . are both inconsistent 
with Section 905(b) and therefore should not be relied upon to 
create a duty on the part of the ship owner."); see also Scindia 
Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 168 n.14 
(1981) (stating that "those sections, while not irrelevant, do 
not furnish sure guidance in cases such as this").  But we 
rejected those sections because Congress, in amending the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, expressly 
indicated its intent to abolish assumption of risk when it 
eliminated contributory negligence.  See id. at 166 n.13 ("The 
Committees also anticipated that in § 905(b) cases, as in other 
admiralty cases, the rule of comparative negligence would apply 
and the defense of assumption of risk would be barred."); H.R. 
Rep. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4705 ("[T]he Committee intends that the 
admiralty rule which precludes the defense of 'assumption of 
risk' in an action by an injured employee shall also be 
applicable.").  Similarly, some state legislatures also barred 
assumption of risk when they approved comparative negligence 
statutes.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 
 In abolishing contributory negligence, however, the 
Virgin Islands legislature never gave any indication whether it 
intended to bar assumption of risk.  Thus, the maritime actions 
are distinguishable.  In any event, as the Supreme Court has 
stated, "maritime negligence actions are not necessarily to be 
governed by principles applicable in nonmaritime contexts."  
Scindia Steam, 451 U.S. at 168 n.14. 
16
.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
  
the contrary cases are distinguishable, largely because relevant 
statutes eliminating contributory negligence often expressly 
barred the assumption of risk defense.17  Furthermore, we have 
interpreted the statute in this manner consistently since its 
1973 enactment.  We acknowledge the existence of strong policy 
reasons for completely abandoning the doctrine of assumption of 
risk as an absolute bar to recovery,18 just as there are 
compelling reasons to maintain the defense in its limited form.19  
But unlike other jurisdictions, where the Restatement merely 
serves as a summary of general legal principles for courts to 
accept or reject, the Virgin Islands has designated the 
Restatement as its law, until a contrary statute is approved.20  
Therefore, if the Virgin Islands wishes to abrogate the doctrine 
                     
17
.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
18
.  See, e.g., Sexton, supra, at 905 ("[A]ssumption of risk 
clearly circumvents the purpose of the comparative negligence 
statute by precluding recovery even if the plaintiff's actions 
were reasonable or caused only one percent of the total harm . . 
. ."); see also id. at 903 & n.4 (listing commentators who 
"advocate the complete abolition of the assumption of risk 
defense").   
19
.  See, e.g., Keeton et al., supra, § 68, at 496 (footnotes 
omitted) ("'[P]rimary' implied assumption of risk should also 
logically continue to be an absolute bar after the adoption of 
comparative fault . . . .  This is because assumption of risk in 
this form is really a principle of no duty, or no negligence, and 
so denies the existence of any underlying cause of action.  
Without a breach of duty by the defendant, there is thus 
logically nothing to compare with any misconduct of the 
plaintiff."); see also Sexton, supra, at 903 & n.3 (listing 
commentators supportive of the continuation of assumption of risk 
under comparative negligence).  
20
.  See supra note 2. 
  
of assumption of risk, along with section 343A of the 
Restatement, its legislature must say so, as it did in 1973 with 
contributory negligence. 
  
 C. 
 In applying section 343A of the Restatement to this 
case, the district court granted summary judgment to Quality 
Electric because "it was Monk's decision not to use a tag line 
and instead to hold onto the metal beam that precipitated his 
injuries.  Monk cannot now try to shift the liability to Quality 
Electric simply because they owned the land where the work was 
performed."  Monk, No. 91-0077, slip op. at 12. 
 To the extent the district court based its decision on 
Monk's negligence (or contributory negligence), we believe it 
erred.  Instead, the court should have focused on evidence 
demonstrating Monk's awareness of and consent to a "known or 
obvious" danger.  Evidence of Monk's negligence is relevant only 
to show the type of secondary assumption of risk that 
"incorporates the concept of fault on the part of the actor and, 
therefore, overlaps with contributory negligence."  Smollett, 793 
F.2d at 548.  As we have held, such evidence is no longer 
permitted in the Virgin Islands to bar a plaintiff's cause of 
action, but rather only may be used to apportion fault between 
plaintiffs and defendants.  Id.; Keegan, 606 F.2d at 39-41. 
 Nevertheless, as in Smollett, we have little difficulty 
in concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff "fully understood 
the risk of harm to h[im]self and voluntarily chose to enter the 
area of risk."  793 F.2d at 548.  Although the issue of whether a 
danger was "known or obvious" generally is a question of fact for 
a jury, cf. Restatement § 496D cmt. e, there is no dispute in 
this case that Monk actually knew of the risk posed by the power 
  
lines.  As the district court noted, "At all relevant times, the 
Benak Construction crew knew that the power lines were energized 
and posed a possible danger."  Monk, No. 91-0077, slip op. at 3.  
In his deposition, Monk admitted that "I did pay attention to the 
location of the lines.  I looked at them, everybody else on the 
job had looked at them."  He stated he knew that "if somebody 
came in contact with [the power lines], then they were going to 
get electrocuted, get hurt."  Id. at 4 n.2.  As foreman, Monk 
testified he warned others about the danger posed by the power 
lines:  "[A]s I said earlier, I was always trying to stress how 
dangerous they were and to be careful around them."  Id.  
Although Monk contends he did not know the lines were uninsulated 
and the level of their voltage, these factors do not change the 
fact that he knew the location of the lines and that they posed a 
serious danger.  Thus, he "assumed the risk of injury."  
Smollett, 793 F.2d at 549.21 
                     
21
.  Section 343A provides that owners of land are not liable to 
invitees for "known or obvious" dangers, "unless the possessor 
should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness."  The Restatement commentary provides guidance on 
the meaning of this exception to the rule: 
 
  Such reason to expect harm to the 
visitor from known or obvious dangers may 
arise, for example, where the possessor has 
reason to expect that the invitee's attention 
may be distracted, so that he will not 
discover what is obvious, or will forget what 
he has discovered, or fail to protect himself 
against it.  Such reason may also arise where 
the possessor has reason to expect that the 
invitee will proceed to encounter the known 
or obvious danger because to a reasonable man 
in his position the advantages of doing so 
would outweigh the apparent risk. 
  
 D. 
 Monk also asserts that Quality Electric violated its 
duties under section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
which involves "Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by 
Possessor."22  We cannot agree.  The Restatement provides that 
sections 343 and 343A "should be read together," with the latter 
section dealing "with the effect of the fact that the condition 
is known to the invitee, or is obvious to him . . . ."  
(..continued) 
 
Restatement § 343A cmt. f.  This exception does not apply in 
circumstances like the present, in which the visitor on the land 
has been hired precisely for the work that involves or creates 
the risk itself.  In such circumstances, the landowner has no 
reason to expect that the visitor will be distracted or forget 
about the danger.  Here, Monk's testimony reveals he was acutely 
aware of the power lines at the time of the accident, and that is 
why he chose to proceed without a tag line.  See Monk, No. 91-
0077, slip. op. at 4 & n.3.  Indeed, as foreman, Monk repeatedly 
warned others to be careful around the power lines.  See 
discussion in text. 
22
.  Section 343 provides: 
 
 A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he 
 
  (a) knows or by the exercise of 
reasonable care would discover the condition, 
and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, 
and 
 
  (b) should expect that they will not 
discover or realize the danger, or will fail 
to protect themselves against it, and 
 
  (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to 
protect them against the danger. 
  
Restatement § 343 cmt. a.  By contrast, section 343 is intended 
to apply "to protect invitees from non-obvious dangerous 
conditions on the land."  Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 975 F.2d 
1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1417 
(1993).23  We have held that the power lines above Quality 
Electric's land were both "known" and "obvious"; thus, section 
343 does not apply here.   
 III. 
 Finally, Monk argues that Quality Electric 
violated its duty under Restatement section 
413, which involves an employer's "Duty to 
Provide for Taking of Precautions Against 
Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted to 
Contractor."  Section 413 provides:   One 
who employs an independent contractor to do 
work which the employer should recognize as 
likely to create, during its progress, a 
peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm 
to others unless special precautions are 
taken, is subject to liability for physical 
                     
23
.  See also Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541, 
563 (3d Cir. 1979) (Garth, J., concurring) (citation omitted) 
(Sections 343 and 343A "establish that the 'possessors of land 
. . .  are liable for physical harm caused to invitees by 
dangerous conditions which are not obvious to the invitee (§ 
343), but are absolved from liability when dangerous conditions 
are known or obvious, except when the possessor should anticipate 
the harm despite the invitee's knowledge or the obviousness of 
the condition. (§ 343A).'"). 
  
harm caused to them by the absence of such 
precautions if the employer 
 
  (a) fails to provide in the contract 
that the contractor shall take such 
precautions, or 
 
  (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to 
provide in some other manner for the taking 
of such precautions. 
 At common law, the general rule was that "the employer 
of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm 
caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his 
servants."  Restatement § 409; see also Williams v. Martin 
Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030, 1036 (3d Cir. 1987).  Yet, 
courts began recognizing so many exceptions to that rule "that it 
can now be said to be 'general' only in the sense that it is 
applied where no good reason is found for departing from it."  
Restatement § 409 cmt. b.  The Restatement divided the exceptions 
into those based on an employer's direct negligence, see §§ 410-
15, and those involving vicarious liability imposed on the 
employer due to the negligence of the independent contractor, see 
§§ 416-29.  See Restatement ch. 15, topic 2, introductory note, 
at 394.  Therefore, any liability under section 413 must be based 
on an employer's direct negligence. 
 Quality Electric urges us to consider whether the word 
"others," under section 413 and elsewhere in chapter 15 of the 
Restatement, even encompasses an independent contractor's 
employees, thereby allowing them to file suit against their 
employer's employer for injuries sustained on the job.  Courts 
  
for the Virgin Islands are divided on this issue,24 as are other 
courts throughout the country.  See Keeton et al., supra, § 71, 
at 514 n.63 ("There is disagreement over whether the doctrine 
protects third parties only or includes as well the contractor's 
employees."). 
                     
24
.  In 1975, the District Court of the Virgin Islands ruled that 
the meaning of "others," under sections 416 and 427 of the 
Restatement, did not encompass employees of an independent 
contractor.  Munson v. Duval, 11 V.I. 615, 630-33 (D.V.I. 1975).  
A decade later, in "reaffirm[ing]" that rule, the court noted: 
 
  Time has proven the wisdom of Chief 
Judge Christian's holding in Munson, supra, 
as jurisdiction after jurisdiction issued a 
ruling to the same effect.  The net result is 
that today, ten years later, the overwhelming 
number of jurisdictions are uniform in their 
interpretation of the word "others" in 
Chapter 15 of the Restatement of Torts, 
(Second), as excluding employees of 
independent contractors. 
 
Gibson v. Sullivan Trail Coal Co., 608 F. Supp. 390, 392 
(D.V.I.), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Harris v. 
No. 1 Contracting Corp. Excavation Constr. Co., 22 V.I. 3, 7-9 
(V.I. T.C. 1986) (applying Gibson).     
 
 Other courts in the Virgin Islands have attempted to 
limit such holdings to situations in which employers were sued 
under a vicarious liability theory.  See, e.g., Henry v. Hess Oil 
V.I. Corp., 1991 St. Croix Supp. 115, slip op. at 23 (D.V.I. 
1991) ("[S]ince the sole issue in [Gibson] was the employer's 
vicarious liability, the court's citation of those sections 
concerning direct liability was dictum.  Therefore, the Third 
Circuit's affirmation without opinion only went to the 
proposition that the employer of an independent contractor is not 
vicariously liable to the contractor's employees, which is 
consistent with this opinion."); see also Olson v. Virgin Islands 
Tel. Corp., 1986 St. Thomas Supp. 204, slip op. at 3 (D.V.I. 
1986); Hood v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 650 F. Supp. 678, 679-80 
(D.V.I. 1986).  Thus, while the Virgin Islands courts agree that 
employers cannot be held vicariously liable to employees of their 
independent contractor, they are divided on whether such 
employees can sue the employers for their direct negligence based 
on Chapter 15 of the Restatement. 
  
 A. 
 Section 413, as well as sections 41625 and 427,26 
essentially adopts the "peculiar risk" doctrine, which developed 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century out of a recognition 
that "a landowner who chose to undertake inherently dangerous 
activity on his land should not escape liability for injuries to 
others simply by hiring an independent contractor to do the 
work."  Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721, 724-25 & n.2 
(Cal. 1993) (in banc).  The American Law Institute incorporated 
this doctrine in the Second Restatement under certain provisions 
of Chapter 15, which generally address the liability of employers 
                     
25
.  Section 416 provides: 
 
 One who employs an independent contractor to 
do work which the employer should recognize 
as likely to create during its progress a 
peculiar risk of physical harm to others 
unless special precautions are taken, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused 
to them by the failure of the contractor to 
exercise reasonable care to take such 
precautions, even though the employer has 
provided for such precautions in the contract 
or otherwise. 
26
.  Section 427 provides: 
 
 One who employs an independent contractor to 
do work involving a special danger to others 
which the employer knows or has reason to 
know to be inherent in or normal to the work, 
or which he contemplates or has reason to 
contemplate when making the contract, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused 
to such others by the contractor's failure to 
take reasonable precautions against such 
danger. 
  
of independent contractors when they or their contractors have 
been negligent.      
 An early draft of the Second Restatement of Torts 
included a Special Note that excluded employees of the 
independent contractor from filing suit under its provisions.  
That note, which ultimately was not adopted, provided:   
  Special Note.  The rules stated in this 
Chapter are, in general, not applicable to 
make the defendant who hires an independent 
contractor liable to two classes of persons. 
 
  One consists of the employees, or 
servants, of the defendant himself . . . . 
 
  . . . . 
   
  The other class of plaintiffs not 
included in this Chapter consists of the 
employees of the independent contractor.  As 
the common law developed, the defendant who 
hired the contractor was under no obligation 
to the servants of the contractor, and it was 
the contractor who was responsible for their 
safety.  The one exception which developed 
was that the servants of the contractor doing 
work upon the defendant's land were treated 
as invitees of the defendant, to whom he owed 
a duty of reasonable care to see that the 
premises were safe.  This is still true.  See 
§ 343.  In other respects, however, it is 
still largely true that the defendant has no 
responsibility to the contractor's servants.  
One reason why such responsibility has not 
developed has been that the workman's 
recovery is now, with relatively few 
exceptions, regulated by workmen's 
compensation acts, the theory of which is 
that the insurance out of which the 
compensation is to be paid is to be carried 
by the workman's own employer, and of course 
premiums are to be calculated on that basis.  
While workmen's compensation acts not 
infrequently provide for third-party 
liability, it has not been regarded as 
necessary to impose such liability upon one 
  
who hires the contractor, since it is to be 
expected that the cost of the workmen's 
compensation insurance will be included by 
the contractor in his contract price for the 
work, and so will in any case ultimately be 
borne by the defendant who hires him. 
 
  Again, when the Sections in this Chapter 
speak of liability to "another" or "others," 
or to "third persons," it is to be understood 
that the employees of the contractor, as well 
as those of the defendant himself, are not 
included.   
Restatement ch. 15 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1962).  The American 
Law Institute omitted this note, however, at the recommendation 
of William L. Prosser, the reporter for the Second Restatement.  
39 A.L.I. Proc. 244-49 (1962).  Prosser suggested the provision 
be dropped because of a lack of uniformity on the issue, 
particularly because of the effect of the various state workers' 
compensation acts.  Id. at 246.  Nevertheless, he stated that 
"certainly the prevailing point of view is that there is no 
liability on the part of the employer of the independent 
contractor."  Id. at 247. 
   In the first decade after the adoption of the 
Restatement, courts split on whether to permit a contractor's 
employees to sue under the peculiar risk provisions of Chapter 
15.27  Since the early 1980s, however, an overwhelming majority 
                     
27
.  As the Washington Supreme Court noted in 1981: 
 
  Other jurisdictions which have faced 
this issue are divided over whether employers 
of an independent contractor owe to the 
employees of the contractor a nondelegable 
duty of care based on the presence of an 
inherently dangerous activity.  Several 
jurisdictions have held that such a 
  
of state high courts to consider the issue have held that 
employers are not liable to such employees,28 with some even 
overruling prior interpretations of the Restatement.29  A 
majority of our sister circuits also have so ruled when called 
(..continued) 
nondelegable duty is owed to employees of 
independent contractors.  The overwhelming 
number of jurisdictions which have resolved 
this issue have found, however, that no duty 
is owed by an owner to employees of an 
independent contractor. 
 
Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 635 P.2d 426, 429 
(Wash. 1981) (en banc) (citing numerous cases) (footnotes 
omitted).   
28
.  See Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721, 730-31 (Cal. 
1993) (in banc); Dillard v. Strecker, 877 P.2d 371, 385 (Kan. 
1994); Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128, 
131-32 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (citing Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway 
Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)); 
Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Rinehart, 665 P.2d 270, 273 (Nev. 1983); 
Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 734 P.2d 1258, 1263 (N.M. 1987) 
(citing New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 551 P.2d 634 
(N.M. 1976)); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 635 P.2d 
426, 429-31 (Wash. 1981) (en banc); Wagner v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 421 N.W.2d 835, 841, 844 (Wis. 1988); Stockwell v. 
Parker Drilling Co., 733 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 1987) (citing 
Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986)); cf. 
Rowley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 505 A.2d 494, 503 (Md. 1986); 
Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 466 N.E.2d 500, 502-04 (Mass. 1984); 
Conover v. Northern States Power Co., 313 N.W.2d 397, 404-07 
(Minn. 1981); Whitaker v. Norman, 551 N.E.2d 579, 580 (N.Y. 
1989); Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445, 454 
(N.D. 1994).  But see Sievers v. McClure, 746 P.2d 885, 887 n.2 
(Alaska 1987); Elliott v. Public Serv. Co., 517 A.2d 1185, 1188 
(N.H. 1986). 
29
.  See, e.g., Privette, 854 P.2d at 726, 730 n.4 (overruling a 
line of cases stretching back more than 30 years); Zueck, 809 
S.W.2d at 390. 
  
upon to resolve the issue in cases under state30 and federal31 
law.   
                     
30
.  See, e.g., Scofi v. McKeon Constr. Co., 666 F.2d 170, 172 
(5th Cir. 1982) (Florida law); Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum 
Co., 801 F.2d 936, 940-42 (7th Cir. 1986) (Illinois law); Vagle 
v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1217-19 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(Minnesota law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980); cf. Lipka v. 
United States, 369 F.2d 288, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1966) (New York 
law), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935 (1967).  But see Lindler v. 
District of Columbia, 502 F.2d 495, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(District of Columbia law). 
 
 We have previously noted that at least one jurisdiction 
within this circuit follows the "minority" rule.  See Toole v. 
United States, 588 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing Gonzalez 
v. United States Steel Corp., 374 A.2d 1334, 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1977)).  This result, however, does not bind us here.  First, the 
Pennsylvania case we cited as our authority, Gonzalez, was 
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which, in affirming, 
declined to decide this issue.  See Gonzalez v. United States 
Steel Corp., 398 A.2d 1378, 1384 n.10 (Pa. 1979) ("U.S. Steel 
argues that Section 410 (and Section 413) do not impose liability 
upon an employer of an independent contractor for injuries 
incurred by employees of the independent contractor.  We agree, 
however, with plaintiffs that this contention was not preserved 
for our review.").  But see Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., 622 
A.2d 1383, 1386 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) ("[I]t is apparent that 
the law in this Commonwealth is that employees of an independent 
contractor are parties under §§ 416 and 427 to whom an obligation 
can flow.").  Second, an interpretation of the Restatement by one 
jurisdiction within this circuit does not compel the same 
interpretation for another such jurisdiction.  In fact, we 
already have predicted that New Jersey would reject the minority 
rule that Pennsylvania may have adopted.  See Merklin v. United 
States, 788 F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1986) ("New Jersey would 
prohibit the contractor's employees from recovering against the 
employer.  The traditional approach holds that the inherently 
dangerous doctrine protects only third parties and not the 
contractor's employees."). 
31
.  See, e.g., Chavis v. Finnlines, Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072, 
1081 (4th Cir. 1978); Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 
1030, 1033-35 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing numerous cases), cert. 
denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 
469, 474-79 (9th Cir. 1980); Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 
634, 635-37 (10th Cir. 1967); cf. Evans v. Transportacion 
  
 Most of these courts have not permitted employer 
liability to a contractor's employees for four fundamental 
reasons.  First, following the reasoning of the Restatement's 
unadopted Special Note, courts have noted that workers' 
compensation statutes preclude employees from recovering against 
the independent contractor, even though it oversaw and permitted 
the unsafe working conditions, but do not bar suits against the 
contractor's employer.  This result appears inequitable, 
particularly when the employer is indirectly paying the cost of 
the workers' compensation premiums: 
  As one court observed, the "principal" 
who hires an independent contractor should be 
subject to no greater liability "than its 
[independent contractor] agent," whose 
exposure for injury to an employee is limited 
to providing workers' compensation insurance.  
Other courts have reasoned that the rule of 
workers' compensation exclusivity, which 
shields an independent contractor who pays 
workers' compensation insurance premiums from 
further liability to its employees for on-
the-job injuries, should equally protect the 
property owner who, in hiring the contractor, 
is indirectly paying for the cost of such 
coverage, which the contractor presumably has 
calculated into the contract price. 
Privette, 854 P.2d at 728 (citation omitted).32    
 A second and related reason why courts have barred 
employees from recovering against their employer's employer is 
(..continued) 
Maritime Mexicana S.S. Campeche, 639 F.2d 848, 859 (2d Cir. 
1981). 
32
.  For additional authority on this point, see Dillard, 877 
P.2d at 385; Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 390; Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 451-
52; Tauscher, 635 P.2d at 430-31; Wagner, 421 N.W.2d at 842-43; 
Merklin, 788 F.2d at 176. 
  
that such liability is not necessary to achieve the original aims 
of the doctrine of peculiar risk.  Liability under the doctrine 
is not necessary, in cases of injuries to a contractor's 
employees, because: 
 the workers' compensation system of recovery 
regardless of fault achieves the identical 
purposes that underlie recovery under the 
doctrine of peculiar risk: it ensures 
compensation for injury by providing swift 
and sure compensation to employees for any 
workplace injury; it spreads the risk created 
by the performance of dangerous work to those 
who contract for and thus benefit from such 
work, by including the cost of workers' 
compensation insurance in the price for the 
contracted work; and it encourages industrial 
safety. 
Id. at 730; see also Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 
N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1994); Wagner v. Continental Casualty Co., 
421 N.W.2d 835, 842-43 (Wis. 1988).    
 In fact, the third reason cited by courts for 
forbidding employer liability is that such liability may actually 
decrease workplace safety.  Most employers probably would have 
little trouble determining those dangers that might be peculiarly 
risky to passers-by uninvolved in a construction project.  As the 
Missouri Supreme Court noted, "Common sense permits a landowner 
to identify the potential of harm which an activity may create to 
persons not participating in the activity."  Zueck v. Oppenheimer 
Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Mo. 1991) (en 
banc).   Yet, the risks to a contractor's workers and the 
protections necessary to reduce such risks "are often beyond the 
owner's expertise."  Id.  Independent contractors are frequently, 
  
if not usually, hired because the landowner is aware of his own 
lack of expertise and seeks to have the work performed as safely 
and efficiently as possible by hiring those possessing the 
expertise he lacks. 
 
  If the landowner chooses to avoid the 
additional liability imposed by the 
inherently dangerous exception, he may choose 
to direct his own employees to do the work 
despite his and their lack of expertise.  
That simple choice limits the landowner's 
exposure to that provided under worker's 
compensation.  But that choice also increases 
the risk of injury to the employees and to 
innocent third parties. 
Id. at 387-88 (footnote omitted).33  Furthermore, permitting 
employer liability to a contractor's employees also ignores "the 
fact that the economic system permits workers who presume to 
undertake dangerous work to bargain for an enhanced reward for 
assuming the danger."  Id. at 390 (footnote omitted); see also 
Dillard v. Strecker, 877 P.2d 371, 385 (Kan. 1994). 
 Finally, courts point out that employers need not be 
held liable to employees of an independent contractor under the 
peculiar risk provisions of Chapter 15 of the Restatement because 
other remedies exist besides workers' compensation.  A 
contractor's employees, along with other invitees, still have the 
right to sue for certain latent defects on the land, see 
Restatement § 343, or for "known or obvious" dangers whose harm 
should have been anticipated, see id. § 343A.  Cf. Tauscher v. 
                     
33
.  See also Dillard, 877 P.2d at 385; Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 452; 
Tauscher, 635 P.2d at 431; Wagner, 421 N.W.2d at 842.   
  
Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 635 P.2d 426, 430 (Wash. 1981) (en 
banc); Restatement Special Note (unadopted), supra. 
  
 B. 
 We are persuaded by the reasoning of these courts; 
thus, we hold that, under Virgin Islands law, employees of an 
independent contractor are not included within the protected 
class of "others" under the peculiar risk provisions of Chapter 
15 of the Restatement.  We acknowledge that a minority of 
jurisdictions have held to the contrary.  And we understand the 
concerns expressed by courts in those states, particularly that 
of holding tortfeasors liable for their actions and protecting 
workers on the job.34  But we believe the interpretation chosen 
by the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions is the better rule, 
for the reasons already expressed. 
 We also believe this rule is consistent with the 
policies expressed in the Virgin Islands Workmen's Compensation 
Act, V.I. Code Ann. tit 24, §§ 251-85 (1993).  As we have noted, 
this Act, like "other workers compensation legislation, is 
designed to 'provide prompt payment of benefits without regard to 
fault.'"  Chinnery v. Government of V.I., 865 F.2d 68, 71 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).  But the Act's other fundamental 
                     
34
.  Courts that have held employers liable to such employees 
under section 413 offer a variety of reasons for their decisions.  
A few courts, noting that section 413 is a theory of direct 
liability, find it appropriate to hold employers liable for their 
own acts of negligence.  See, e.g. Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 
214-15 (Alaska 1982).  Some courts point out that the Special 
Note to the Restatement, see supra part III.A, was not adopted 
and thus is not entitled to deference.  See, e.g., Lindler v. 
District of Columbia, 502 F.2d 495, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  
Other courts apparently following the minority view simply seem 
to be adhering to longtime precedent.  See, e.g., Bosak v. 
Hutchinson, 375 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Mich. 1985).  
  
purpose is "to relieve employers and employees of the burden of 
civil litigation."  Id.  We believe our interpretation of these 
sections of the Restatement furthers the latter purpose of the 
Act without impairing the former purpose. 
   As a final matter, we should clarify that this holding 
extends to actions under the direct liability provision of 
section 413, as well as the vicarious liability provisions of 
sections 416 and 427.  The courts for the Virgin Islands have 
attempted to distinguish the two situations,35 but the same 
reasoning applies to both.36  In fact, most courts have cited 
section 413, as well as sections 416 and 427, in holding that 
employers are not liable to a contractor's employees under the 
doctrine of peculiar risk.37  
                     
35
.  See supra note 24. 
36
.  See, e.g., Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 
S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) ("The same reasons . . . for 
rejecting a claim under § 416 are equally persuasive to reject a 
claim under § 413."); Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., 733 P.2d 
1029, 1032 (Wyo. 1987) ("The same logic and reasoning applies to 
§ 413, and we agree that § 413 also does not apply to the 
employee of an independent contractor.").  Courts considering the 
issue have explicitly refused to distinguish between these 
Restatement sections just because two are under the vicarious 
liability part of Chapter 15 and the other is under the direct 
liability heading. See Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721, 
725 n.2 (Cal. 1993) (in banc); cf. Dillard, 877 P.2d at 378. 
37
.  See Privette, 854 P.2d at 725-26 & 725 n.2 (citing sections 
413 and 416); Dillard, 877 P.2d at 375-85 (adopting reasoning of 
numerous cases deciding issue under sections 413, 416, and 427); 
Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 131-32 (citing Zueck v. Oppenheimer 
Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo. 1991) (en 
banc)) (citing sections 413, 416, and 427); Sierra Pac. Power Co. 
v. Rinehart, 665 P.2d 270, 273 (Nev. 1983) (citing sections 413 
and 416); Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 734 P.2d 1258, 1263 
(N.M. 1987) (citing New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 551 
P.2d 634 (N.M. 1976)) (citing sections 413, 416, and 427);  
  
 C. 
 Applying this interpretation of the Restatement and its 
underlying reasoning to the facts of this case, it becomes clear 
why employers should not be held liable to an independent 
contractor's employees under section 413.  The contract between 
the parties required Benak to obtain workers' compensation 
insurance; thus, as in the cases already noted, Quality Electric 
was "indirectly" paying for such coverage. 
 Furthermore, instead of using its own employees, who 
may have been unfamiliar with such work, Quality Electric hired 
Benak, a company experienced in working near power lines.38  The 
accident here was tragic; such work, however, might routinely be 
deadly if Quality Electric and other landowners used their own 
inexperienced workers merely to avoid liability to third parties. 
(..continued) 
Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 635 P.2d 426, 429-30 
(Wash. 1981) (en banc) (citing sections 413, 414, 416, and 427); 
Wagner v. Continental Casualty Co., 421 N.W.2d 835, 841, 844 
(Wis. 1988) (citing sections 413, 416, and 427); Stockwell, 733 
P.2d at 1032 (citing Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 
(Wyo. 1986)) (citing sections 413 and 416). 
 
 Other state high courts have decided that employers are 
not liable to an independent contractor's employees under 
sections 416 and 427, but did not discuss whether the rule 
applies to section 413.  See, e.g., Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 
466 N.E.2d 500, 502-04 (Mass. 1984); Conover v. Northern States 
Power Co., 313 N.W.2d 397, 404-07 (Minn. 1981); Fleck v. ANG Coal 
Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445, 454 (N.D. 1994); cf. Rowley v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, 505 A.2d 494, 503 (Md. 1986).  
38
.  As the district court noted, deposition testimony revealed 
that "Benak Construction had worked on other projects where the 
power lines were in an even closer vicinity than in the instant 
case, and Benak Construction did not consider the situation at 
the Quality Electric site to be a problem."  Monk, No. 91-0077, 
slip op. at 10 n.9. 
  
 We also fail to see what more Quality Electric 
reasonably could have done to increase safety.  There is no 
question that officials from Quality Electric and Benak discussed 
the power lines and their dangers.  Monk, No. 91-0077, slip op. 
at 8-9.  It also is beyond dispute that, after these discussions, 
Benak supervisors contacted WAPA about the power lines and that 
the contract required Benak to assume the responsibility for the 
work site and related safety precautions.  Id. at 9.  Although 
the power lines traveled over Quality Electric's land, they did 
not service Quality Electric but rather an adjacent property.  
Id. at 3 n.1.  And it is clear that Quality Electric officials 
had given control of the site over to the independent contractor 
while they worked in temporary offices nearby.  Id. at 7-8.  
Under these circumstances, the contractor, not Quality Electric, 
was in the best position to gauge what measures were necessary to 
protect the workers at the site from danger.   
   IV. 
 Based on the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
  
 
